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ABSTRACT
As the proliferation of digital computational systems continue to expand,
increasingly complex technologies emerge, including those regarding large,
enterprise-wide, information storage and retrieval systems. Within this study, we
examine four contemporary enterprise storage technologies. Our examination of
these technologies is presented with an overview of the technological features of
each offering and then followed with a discussion of the impact of these
technologies on digital forensics methods, particularly regarding forensic data
acquisition. We offer a general opinion concerning a recommended data
acquisition method when faced with the task of obtaining a forensic image of data
contained within these technologies, we discuss limitations of our study, and
lastly, we suggest areas in which additional research would benefit the field of
digital forensics.
1. INTRODUCTION
The evolution and adoption of contemporary enterprise data storage technologies
provide challenges to traditional approaches for computer forensic data
acquisition (Mohay, 2005). Some of these technologies invalidate the once
simple relationship between a single storage device or small group of storage
devices and a volume of data presented to a computer or server. In the absence of
this simpler relationship, it will be increasingly difficult to follow traditional
forensic data acquisition procedures in obtaining a forensically sound image of
the data (Carlton, 2007). This article explores some of these technologies and
provides an overview of the challenges they may pose. Alternative approaches
for dealing with the challenges are also explored.
2. OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL FORENSIC DISK IMAGE
ACQUISITION METHODOLOGY
The traditional digital forensic disk image acquisition processes provide the
forensic examiner with physical access to the computer systems, including any
disk storage media. In these situations, forensic examiners have access to the
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physical disk drives and are able to acquire static, or dead, forensic drive images
from each of the physical disk drives. In situations involving servers, the
traditional dead acquisition utilizes a standard server shutdown procedure. A
hardware or software write blocker is used to prevent altering data on the
evidence drive(s) and a bit-stream image of the evidence drive is made (Lessing
& von Solms, 2008). The traditional forensic data acquisition approach for
servers utilizing an array of multiple physical disk drives into a logical volume,
RAID configuration, provides the forensic examiner with two alternatives for
static data acquisition. He or she may statically image each of the individual
physical drives and then reassemble them into a logical disk volume using their
forensic analysis tools, such as EnCase. In situations where the forensic examiner
is not able to reassemble the individual disks into a logical volume, the forensic
examiner may statically image the logical RAID volume from the server.
An alternative to static data acquisition is a live disk image acquisition. While a
static data acquisition is arguably preferred from scientific and legal perspectives,
practical objections based on temporal and fiscal factors frequently restrict the
static data acquisition of servers. Citing these objections as a justification for best
evidence, a live acquisition alternative may be necessary when the target server
cannot be taken down for forensic drive imaging. Additionally, a live acquisition
is a viable alternative when the forensic examiner does not have physical access
to the evidence storage media. Live acquisitions typically utilize the use of a
software agent or acquisition tool on the target. This may require the installation
of the acquisition software on the host server after the fact, unless it was
proactively installed. This technique introduces an alteration to the data that
would need to be documented, and accepted as best evidence. A forensic drive
image obtained in this manner would be similar to the logical drive image
described above as it is acquired from the host end and not directly from the disk
drives themselves. Tools such as EnCase Enterprise Edition can be used to
perform a live acquisition when static imaging is not possible (Guidance
Software, 2011). An additional challenge to this live acquisition method concerns
the realization that data is dynamic during the live acquisition process; therefore,
the ability of validating the acquisition process through duplication will not
produce matching hash values.
The static and live data acquisition methods have been recognized in the practice
of digital forensics for over half of a decade. While both of these methods have
their merits and limitations, these traditional forensic data acquisition methods
were based on assumptions that suspect computer systems consisted of physical
computational devices and physical storage media. In the following section, we
discuss aspects of contemporary storage technologies that do not necessarily hold
these assumptions.
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3. DISCUSSION OF CONTEMPORARY ENTERPRISE STORAGE
TECHNOLOGIES
As advances in computational hardware, software, and information storage and
retrieval technology continue to develop, numerous alternatives are emerging into
the marketplace that challenge the traditional notion of physical computational
devices and physical storage media. Within this section, we discuss four emerging
storage technologies targeted at the enterprise storage market, namely: enterprise
storage arrays and logical volumes, automatic storage tiering, data deduplication,
and thin provisioning. While these technologies differ in their approach regarding
information storage and retrieval, each provides specific challenges for digital
forensic examiners.
3.1 Enterprise storage arrays and logical volumes
Enterprise storage arrays and logical volumes focus on storage technologies
commonly found in enterprise storage area network (SAN) storage arrays. The
use of large enterprise storage arrays introduces multiple challenges to the
traditional forensic disk image acquisition where direct access to the physical
storage media is separated by an additional level of abstraction. These logical
storage arrays can consist of hundreds of physical disk storage devices that are
used in the creation of logical units (LUN). LUNs are logical partitions of
redundant array of independent disks (RAID) groups from the storage system
(EMC Corporation, 2006). Hosts deriving storage from the storage system see a
LUN as they would an individual disk drive. The host is unaware of the exact
physical makeup of the LUNs delivered by the storage array. A LUN may consist
of a single physical drive or many drives in RAID1, RAID5, RAID10, or other
arrangement. This additional level of abstraction raises the following challenges
to the process of forensically acquiring data from a server utilizing enterprise
storage arrays:
1. Negative impact of downtime – The multi-user nature of servers
frequently result in financial and legal objections to taking a server
offline for the period of time necessary for forensic examiners to
obtain a static image of the data. These objections are likely to be
compounded in configurations utilizing enterprise storage arrays,
as multiple servers may share the storage arrays. Given the multiuser nature of servers and the impact on multiple servers, it may
not be feasible to take the server down the time necessary to
perform a traditional static drive acquisition due to the broader
impact of the downtime.
2. Additional complexity - The fact that the association between
physical drives and the server is not as straightforward adds further
complexity. It would take collaboration with the storage system
administrator to identify all involved storage devices as well as the
specific RAID algorithm and parameters in order to access the
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drives for forensic imaging and later reassemble the data into a
usable form. In addition to the challenge presented by this
additional technical complexity, additional legal complexity will
likely surface in situations where physical storage devices are
logically shared among different legal entities.
3. Broader impact of shared storage - Even if the server can be taken
out of service, the storage devices (disk drives) might not be
dedicated to just the server in question. This means that additional
services would be impacted if drives were physically removed for
forensic disk imaging.
Despite the challenges identified above, it may still be feasible to perform a
physical forensic drive acquisition in situations where a manageable number of
drives are involved and where they can be physically accessed. A logical
acquisition of the LUN itself is also still possible. The remaining storage
technologies that will be discussed will build on top of the concept of LUNS in
presenting a logical disk or storage volume to server hosts, and present additional
challenges which may prohibit the more direct forensic imaging of physical disk
drives.
3.2 Automatic storage tiering
Storage and server administrators have been using a tiered approach for storage
management for many years. Administrators would allocate storage to servers
based on performance and capacity needs, and this could be done on a per-LUN
basis as required. Tiering involves allocating LUNs from various groups of
storage devices which are grouped by criteria, such as, differing performance
levels and capacities. For example, one might configure three tiers using these
criteria: a capacity tier based on low-cost, high- capacity SATA drives, a
performance tier based on faster, fiber channel drives, and even an ultra-high
performance tier based on solid state drives. In this scenario, lower priority or
bulk storage applications would be allocated LUNS from the lower tier, while
higher priority applications would require storage from the high performance tier
or ultra-high performance tier. The manual allocation of LUNS from different
tiers of storage does not necessarily introduce additional significant challenges to
forensic imaging.
However, unlike the manual allocation of LUNS described above, automated
storage tiering introduces significant changes to the scenario. Automated storage
tiering allows a storage system to automatically identify “hot data” and move that
data to higher performing data storage devices (Feresten, Freeman, & Woods,
2011). This simplifies storage data management by eliminating or reducing
manual storage management, and it has the potential to reduce storage costs by
using low-cost storage where permitted while intelligently moving high-use data
to faster storage devices.
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When automated storage tiering is utilized, there are two important differences to
consider regarding data movement. First, data are moved between storage tiers
automatically as dictated by the storage system for optimized performance.
Second, the entire volume or LUN is not necessarily moved. Individual blocks or
predefined chunks of data are moved between storage tiers. The storage system
maintains a bitmap record of the physical location of all the data for each LUN
(Hernandez, 2011). The movement of data is done transparently to the host
server. The unit size of data moving between the different storage tiers is specific
to a vendor’s own implementation. NetApp’s implementation allows for the
movement of data as small as a 4k block between storage tiers (Feresten,
Freeman, & Woods, 2011). EMC moves data between different storage tiers in
1GB chunks (Hernandez, 2011).
Automated storage tiering introduces the variable of dynamic change in the
physical location of data across a number of storage devices. This eliminates
having a fixed, defined space on discrete disk drives where all data for a given
LUN may reside, thus making it impractical, if not impossible, to directly acquire
individual forensic disk images to reconstruct a logical disk volume. As a result
of this limitation, it is then necessary for the forensic examiner to rely on the
acquisition of a logical disk image from the server’s view of the LUN or logical
disk volume.
3.3 Data deduplication
Data deduplication is another storage technology that presents additional
challenges to the traditional forensic disk image acquisition process. Data
deduplication is a storage compression tool used to reduce storage capacity
requirements, and it is used in both inline storage (i.e., online, secondary storage)
and backup storage functions. Data deduplication in disk storage refers to the use
of an algorithm that searches for duplicate data, and then removes the duplicates.
Duplicate data is replaced with reference pointers to a single copy of identical
data (Freeman & NetApp, 2009). Data deduplication is generally done at a block
or file level and involves processing the data with a hash algorithm such as SHA1 or MD5 to generate an index value for each block or file (Bigelow & Hawkins,
2008). When new data are being written, the index value created is compared to a
maintained bitmap or index table for existing data to determine if the new data
already exists. New data is written to the logical storage device, while duplicate
data is simply accounted for in the bitmap or index table without writing another
instance of the data to the logical storage device (Hernandez, 2011). In addition to
the inline technique of data deduplication described above, these algorithms can
work a post-process. When data deduplication is configured as a post-process,
data are written to the target LUN without regard to duplication, and a scheduled
process periodically evaluates all newly written data, removing duplicates to
reclaim the space while placing the appropriate pointers to the retained single
copy.
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It does not seem feasible to acquire a forensic image from disk drive where data
deduplication is utilized, as it is unrealistic to expect a forensic examiner to
reconstruct data from this image. Reconstructing the data from the image would
require, at a minimum, a complete understanding of the applicable vendor’s
specific deduplication implementation. An additional obstacle is the bitmap index
table used to identify deduplicated files or blocks may not reside on the same disk
drives associated with the LUN. This bitmap index is necessary to identify or
reconstruct all of the missing pieces of data. Based on the unlikely probability of
successfully analyzing data from a physical image of a deduplicated disk, once
again, we recommend forensic examiners obtain an image of logical volumes for
deduplicated disks.
Since data deduplication is based on the use of hashing algorithms to identify
duplicate data, there is also the theoretical possibility of hash collisions resulting
in the incorrect deduplication. The non-duplicate data potentially could be lost
and replaced by the misidentified duplicate. Storage vendors should have
sufficiently mitigated this risk, but it is important for a forensic examiner to be
aware of this potential, at least to defend the validity of any forensic evidence
obtained from a LUN where deduplication is in use. The forensic examiner
should also be aware of the level (block or file) at which any deduplication is
being performed.
3.4 Thin provisioning
Thin provisioning is a storage technology used to optimize the efficiency of
storage capacity usage in enterprise storage systems. Floyer states, “With thin
provisioning, a storage administrator allocates logical storage to an application as
usual, but the system releases physical capacity only when it is required. When
utilization of that storage approaches a predetermined threshold (e.g. 90%), the
array automatically provides capacity from a virtual storage pool which expands a
volume without involving the storage administrator” (Floyer, 2009).
Thin
provisioning initially allocates only a portion of the physical space for a LUN.
The storage system maintains a map of allocated physical storage which may be
stored in the storage system’s cache memory or private disk (Hernandez, 2011).
Without access to this mapping facility of physical storage, the correct physical
storage devices cannot be identified; therefore, forensic examiners will find it
practically impossible to identify all physical storage devices necessary for
forensic images. Even greater challenges than identifying the appropriate physical
storage devices for the forensic examiner are the problems of identifying the
specific allocation blocks or physical sectors associated with the thin provisioned
volume and the task of reassembling the logical disk volume.
A technique for obtaining the contents of a thin provisioned logical volume is to
generate a host-based dump of the thin provisioned logical volume. This hostbased dump would read all of the data from the target logical volume allocated to
physical storage devices and output a bit-stream copy of this data to a designated
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image file. This is necessary, as the host servers are unaware that only a portion
of the logical volumes’ space resides on physical storage. This is accomplished
by the storage system providing the host server with null characters (i.e., binary
0s) for the remaining non-provisioned space of the LUN. This technique
effectively spoofs the host’s view of the LUN for the unallocated space
(Hernandez, 2011). Often, the server’s view of its storage and the storage
system’s view of the storage associated with a given server are quite different.
Some storage systems provide the capability to add additional disk drives and
then rebalance allocated space of existing LUNS across the added devices. This
is can help spread the IO workload across the entire group of disk drives. This is
particularly important when the data are striped across a group of drives. This
results in shuffling data across the physical drives providing storage for a LUN,
creating another circumstance in which significant data are being moved across
storage devices by the storage system without any host awareness.
Some implementations of thin provisioning include a facility for reclaiming
unused space. This space reclamation provides another challenge for forensics
examiners by removing unallocated clusters. Jooss explains, “Space Reclamation
is the process of allowing the storage system to free the blocks no longer used by
the host operating system” (Jooss, 2008). The space reclamation process may
vary across vendor implementations, for example, some vendors support hostbased processes to identify unused space and communicate using T10 industrystandard, SCSI commands including UNMAP and WRITE_SAME unmap. This
allows the host operating system to communicate unused logical blocks that can
be reclaimed (EMC Corporation, 2011). For NTFS file systems, the SDELETE
utility can be used with the “–c” option to overwrite space occupied by deleted
files with zeros. A process on the storage system will then release space
identified by the host process as unallocated, as well as, any other space
containing all null characters, indicating unused space (Hernandez, 2011). For the
forensic examiner, the completion of this process is likely to further limit the
potential to obtain evidence from unallocated clusters.
In review, we find that the current best practice for acquiring a forensically sound
image of a thin provisioned volume is to acquire a logical image of the LUN. The
forensic examiner should understand that space reclamation has the potential to
also remove traces of prior deleted data as well. At the present time, space
reclamation is still a fairly new technology and is not as widely available as the
other storage technologies discussed here; therefore, while this reduces the
probability that forensic examiners will encounter this technology in the field at
this time, it also increases the probability the specific forensic examiner that
encounters thin provisioning at this time will be unaware of the technology and its
challenges. As with many emerging technologies, we anticipate that thin
provisioning will become more widely implemented in the future, thus raising the
probability of this being a more significant concern for forensic examiners.
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4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Moore’s Law is frequently cited to document the rapid growth of performance
and capacity within the field of computational and digital devices, as “Dr. Gordon
Moore, then a researcher at Intel, hypothesized that computer processing
performance would double every eighteen months” (Valacich & Schneider,
2010). Given this rapid growth rate, combined with the reduction in costs
associated with storage technology, it is understandable that we are experiencing
increasing levels of complexity and capacity in contemporary, enterprise-wide,
information storage and retrieval systems. There is a direct relationship between
the combined complexity and capacity of these storage technologies and the
challenges forensic examiners encounter regarding obtaining useable forensic
images of the data contained within these technologies. We have evaluated four,
non-mutually exclusive, enterprise storage technologies, and reached an opinion
regarding the current best practice for acquiring forensic images of data contained
within these technologies.
Each of the enterprise storage technologies presented above pose added
challenges to traditional forensic data acquisition methodology. Digital forensics
researchers and practitioners should be aware that it is also possible for many of
these storage technologies be used in conjunction, further adding to these
challenges. As a matter of practicality, we find that the best practice for forensic
examiners to utilize when tasked to obtain a forensic image of data stored within
configurations based on these enterprise storage technologies is to rely on a
logical acquisition by taking a forensically-sound, bit-stream image of the LUNs
themselves, and not the physical disk drives. As overview of the basis for
reaching our opinion is presented below:
The first set of factors supporting this opinion is based on matters of practicality.
While a static or dead acquisition of the target LUN can be done from the target
server, or a live acquisition can be performed, either of these is likely to result in
an unacceptable amount of downtime. The static acquisition will result in
extended downtime for the associated server. This may be deemed unacceptable,
forcing the use of a live acquisition process. However, even a live acquisition has
the potential to impact the overall performance of a server should a full
acquisition of any disk volumes be necessary. There is still the I/O burden
associated with a full drive acquisition, and this should be taken into consideration
when deciding on the best approach for data acquisition.
In addition to the amount of time necessary for either a static or live acquisition
described above, contemporary enterprise computational models are likely to
consist of multiple servers, either actual physical servers or virtual servers, and
multiple legal entities may be serviced by these physical or virtual devices. It
becomes increasingly difficult to define the bounds of legal access to forensic
storage targets when multiple servers share virtual portions of physical storage
devices, especially when multiple legal entities are involved.
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In addition to the practical factors presented above, the four contemporary
enterprise storage technologies evaluated utilize virtual storage techniques that
make reconstructing logical volumes from physical devices improbable for
forensic examiners.
While much the focus of this article has been to identify potential challenges
presented by newer enterprise storage technologies, there is also the potential for
them to provide some assistance to the forensic examiner. Many enterprise
storage systems provide the capability to produce a snapshot or clone of a LUN.
This capability has the potential to provide temporal duplicates of data from
logical volumes. An additional advantage of creating a snapshot or clone from
the storage system is that this process generates a relatively low processing
burden on the host server. The snapshot or clone can be done with the server
online, offline, or even powered off since it is performed by the storage system
itself. Also, this technique can be performed at a specific instant for the entire
LUN, addressing potential concerns about changes to a live file system during the
time required to take a forensic image of a volume. The snapshot can be created
and then presented as a LUN on a different server, thus providing a configuration
that can then be used by a forensic examiner to create the logical forensic disk
image without an impact on the original host server. In situations where snapshots
or clones of LUNs are available, we suggest acquiring the snapshot or clone as an
alternative instead of acquiring a logical image of the LUN, as this provides the
best method to obtain a logical, forensically sound, data acquisition.
However, forensic examiners should realize that the combination of thin
provisioning and space reclamation introduces a potential for non-recoverable
deleted data. This should be of concern to forensic examiners, as these
technologies become more widely implemented.
5. LIMITATIONS
Within this study, we have identified and discussed four technologies available in
contemporary, enterprise storage systems. These four technologies were selected
from our survey of the currently available offerings and emerging trends within
the enterprise storage system market. While we did not knowingly omit other
enterprise storage systems technologies from inclusion within this study, the
possibly exists that other relevant technologies either currently exist or are
emerging within this market. The reader should also be aware that, given the rate
of technological advances, it is likely that additional technologies will enter the
marketplace in the future.
There is, however, an entire facet to computing infrastructures, including complex
and remote storage systems that we did not address in this study, namely cloud
computing. While we do not directly address cloud within this study, it is helpful
for the readers to recognize that the enterprise storage facilities described within
this paper are also applicable to cloud computing. Cloud computing encompasses
many aspects of computing environments, including applications, servers, storage
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systems, and network devices. Additionally, cloud computing may be
implemented for a specific application, for an entire enterprise level, or anywhere
between those two extremes. We thought that a discussion on cloud computing
within this paper would distract from the important forensic challenges
concerning enterprise storage facilities; therefore, the primary author of this study,
along with a coauthor, have addressed forensic challenges to cloud computing in
another study, and we would like to refer interested readers to this work, titled, A
survey of cloud computing challenges from a digital forensics perspective
(Carlton & Zhou, in press).
The purpose of this study is to provide computer forensics practitioners and
researchers with an introductory level of understanding of the technologies
currently available in enterprise storage systems, and then to identify challenges
forensic examiners will likely face when tasked with acquiring digital evidence
from systems using these technologies.
Our evaluation methods used within this study are based on research of secondary
data, and much of these data were provided to us directly by technology vendors.
We did not develop any primary data within this study, nor did we conduct
experiments using these technologies; therefore, a limitation exists based on the
extent to which the secondary data provided to us are accurate. Similarly, given
the for-profit motives of the technology vendors, a limitation exists regarding the
possibly of exaggerated claims of technical performance without verified,
independent testing in controlled laboratory conditions.
Lastly, the information presented within this study is based on our understanding
of the data from a technical perspective, as well as, our understanding of current
digital forensics data acquisition and analysis methodologies. We are not
attorneys; therefore, we are not providing legal advice in our opinions. Rather, our
opinions are presented to offer guidelines for forensic examiners, thus allowing
them to consult with attorneys from an informed perspective.
6. CALL FOR ACTION
As indicated within the section on limitations, this study was conducted from
secondary data. A more thorough study utilizing laboratory experiments of data
stored within the technologies identified within this study would be helpful to the
digital forensics community. Studies involving experiments with known, in-tact
data, deleted data, and otherwise concealed data acquired by an array of
methodologies, such as, static, physical acquisition, live acquisition, and static,
logical acquisition from both the server’s perspective and from the perspective of
the LUN would be of particular interest.
Also, more research would be beneficial pertaining to the exploration of the use of
snapshot or clone technologies, specifically addressing forensic considerations.
Areas of particular interest include forensically sound data acquisition guidelines
of snapshot or clone LUN configurations and forensic data analysis of snapshot or

72

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(3)
clone LUN configurations, especially techniques for virtual restores or protected
environment restores.
An additional topic of research that would enhance the understanding of
enterprise storage technologies from a digital forensics perspective would be to
identify markers within the data that would help identify the storage technologies
in use. For example, as described above in section 3.4 Thin Provisioning, some
technologies remove unallocated data; therefore, it would be beneficial to a
forensic examiner to know that this technology is in use within an image he or she
is analyzing. Identifying these markers, if they exist, within the data that identify
the storage technology in use will provide a significant contribution to the
understanding of enterprise storage technologies from a digital forensics
perspective.
REFERENCES
Bigelow, S. J., & Hawkins, J. (2008, September). data deduplication
(Intelligent compression or single-instance storage). Retrieved May 26, 2011,
from SearchStorage.com: http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition/datadeduplication
Carlton, G. H. (2007). A Protocol for the Forensic Data Acquisition of
Personal Computer Workstations. (Doctoral dissertation). (UMI No. 3251043)
.
Carlton, G. H., & Zhou, H. (in press). A survey of cloud computing from a
digital forensics perspective. International Journal of Interdisciplinary
Telecommunications and Networking .
EMC Corporation. (2011). EMC Symmetrix VMAX Virtual Provisioning Space
Reclamation and Application Considerations.
EMC Corporation. (2006). EMC Virtual LUN Technology, A Detailed Review.
Feresten, P., Freeman, L., & Woods, M. (2011). The NetApp Virtual Storage
Tier. NetApp.
Floyer, D. (2009, October 9). Thin Provisioning. Retrieved May 30, 2011,
from wikibon.org: http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/Thin_provisioning
Freeman, L., & NetApp. (2009). Looking Beyond the Hype: Evaluating Data
Deduplication Solutions.
Guidance Software. (2011). EnCase Legal Journal.
Hernandez, N. (2011, 5 25). EMC Technnology Consultant. (J. Matsumoto,
Interviewer)
Jooss, R. (2008). Technical Report: Thin provisioing in a NetApp SAN or IP
SAN Enterprise Environment. Network Appliance Inc.

73

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(3)
Lessing, M., & von Solms, B. (2008). Live Forensic Acquisition as Alternative
to Traditional Forensic Processes. Mannheim, Germany.
Mohay, G. (2005). Technical challenges and directions for digital forensics.
First international workshop on systematic approaches to digital forensic
engineering (pp. 155-161). Taipei, Taiwan: IEEE.
Valacich, J., & Schneider, C. (2010). Information Systems Today, Managing in
the Digital World (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

74

